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THE CORPORATIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH: 
WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED? 
Risa L. Lieberwitz∗ 
The following article is the text of a speech given at the Association 
of American Law Schools annual meeting in January 2005, which has 
been edited and footnoted for publication in the Akron Law Review. 
The “corporatization” of the university has become an important 
concept, particularly since the 1980s, with the ever broadening and 
deepening effects of privatization on a national and global scale.  While 
university corporatization has affected all facets of university functions, 
I will focus on its impact on academic research, with particular attention 
to the life sciences.1  I will begin with an overview of the three issues 
that I will explore in my talk.  After providing this broad overview of the 
three issues, I will explore certain aspects of these three issues in greater 
detail. 
The first issue is the institutional nature of the university.  What 
makes the university a distinctive institution—particularly, as an 
institution in a democratic society?  This institutional characterization 
includes defining the university’s traditional public interest goals and 
corresponding practices in furtherance of the public interest, including 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Labor Law, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; 
associated faculty, Cornell Law School.  B.A. 1976, University of Florida; J.D. 1979, University of 
Florida.  I would like to thank Professor Molly T. O’Brien, Chair of the Education Law Section of 
the Association of American Law Schools for inviting me to participate in the panel on higher 
education at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 2005. 
 1. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Confronting the Privatization and Commercialization of 
Academic Research: An Analysis of Social Implications at the Local, National, and Global Levels, 
12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Social Implications]; Risa L. 
Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the University: Distance Learning at the Cost of Academic 
Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 80–85 (2002) [hereinafter Distance Learning] (discussing the 
impact of corporatization on the teaching function of the university); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The 
Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 781-
83 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)) [hereinafter Marketing of Higher Education] (regarding the impact 
of corporatization on academic research in the university). 
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faculty academic freedom.  The second issue that I will address in my 
talk concerns the changes that have been occurring—particularly since 
1980—in the definition of this institutional character of the university 
and the ways that these changes have affected both the goals and 
practices of the university.  The term used to describe these changes—
“corporatization,” is useful and informative in capturing the changes that 
have had an actual impact and that continue to have potential negative 
effects on multiple areas in the university.  These negative consequences 
include the shift from a public to a private mission of the university, 
which, in turn, has been reflected in changes in the policies and practices 
in university research and teaching functions.  The shift in goals from 
the public to the private interest has also altered professional norms of 
university faculty in ways that undermine faculty academic freedom.  I 
will conclude my talk with a third, larger issue, addressing some recent 
developments that reflect a growing recognition of the problems 
resulting from the corporatization of the university.  These recent 
developments, I believe, also suggest some possibilities for future 
responses that can start to reclaim public interest goals and practices in 
the university.  I always like to give the bad news first and then give 
some hope—you can’t come out of a background in labor law and 
collective action without ending with some hope. 
Returning to the first issue, the institutional nature of the university: 
What makes the university distinctive as an institution—particularly, one 
in a democratic society?  This institutional definition includes defining 
the goals and corresponding practices in the university.  My focus here 
will be on the United States, which entails placing the question of the 
institutional character of the university in a social context that is divided 
into public and the private spheres.2  The existence of the public/private 
distinction raises the question of the appropriate model for the university 
to follow.  First, is the university like a public or governmental 
institution in its goals and organization?  This would create a model for 
defining institutional goals and practices consistent with the public 
interest.  On the other hand, is the university more like an organization 
in the private sphere, but one that is still defined according to public 
interest goals—that is, a private, non-profit organization?  The 
traditional definition of the American university has been as an 
institution with a public interest mission, either as a public university or 
 
 2. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1406-15 (1982). 
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as a private, non-profit university.3  Defining the institutional model in 
terms of public interest goals requires the next step of choosing the 
policy and practices that the university should adopt to further those 
goals.  Two key aspects of shaping institutional policies and practices in 
line with the public interest concern external and internal relationships.  
The first aspect—the relationship between the university and external 
institutions—has traditionally emphasized the university’s independence 
from outside institutions—particularly, independence from financial 
supporters.4  The second aspect—internal relationships—also 
emphasizes independence, focusing on the central role of faculty rights 
of academic freedom to provide faculty the autonomy and independence 
to define and control their work.5 
In defining university goals and practices, and particularly, the 
significance of university and faculty independence and autonomy, it is 
useful to remember the roots of these values in the history of the 
university in the United States.  In the early part of the twentieth century, 
university faculty engaged in collective action to form the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) to claim their rights of 
autonomy in teaching and research as well as in extramural speech.6  
The AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles7 recognizes some basic ideas 
that we still find important today,8 including the need to act collectively 
 
 3. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, available at http://www.aaup.org/ 
statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm#back1a (stating that “[i]nstitutions of higher education are 
conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the 
institution as a whole.”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2005); Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 82-84. 
 4. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 83-85; J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special 
Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273–77 (1989); Walter P. Metzger, Profession 
and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276–
81 (1988). 
 5. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81. 
 6. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 83-85.  Extramural speech includes “speech outside a 
faculty member’s professional duties or disciplinary expertise, whether the speech was made on or 
off campus, thus actually covering intramural and extramural speech.”  Id. at 83; Marketing of 
Higher Education, supra note 1, at 791. 
 7. THE 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 40 AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS BULL. 89 
(1954), reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 155, 155–76 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967) [hereinafter 
1915 DECLARATION]. 
 8. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 155-76.  The 1915 Declaration led to a response 
in 1925 by the American Council on Education, which called a conference of higher education 
organizations for the purpose of issuing a joint statement of principles of academic freedom and 
tenure.  Id. at 157.  The resulting 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
was followed by the AAUP 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which was 
endorsed by the Association of American Colleges, and over subsequent decades, by over 150 
academic professional organizations and universities.  Id.  The 1940 Statement of Principles, which 
3
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to protect faculty from retaliation for their academic work and public 
speech, which results when university administrators respond to 
pressures from powerful industrialists acting as trustees or financial 
benefactors of universities.9  The Declaration of Principles also 
recognizes that faculty academic freedom is essential to enable faculty to 
do their work in a way that fulfills the university’s public mission and its 
social role as a public trust,10 free from the influence of third parties, 
whether these are university administrators or trustees, legislators, or 
corporate financial donors.11  The Declaration of Principles broadly 
defines academic freedom to include teaching, research, and extramural 
speech.12  The resulting Declaration of Principles recognizes that 
academic freedom provides both individual and collective rights of 
faculty, encompassing individual faculty autonomy and independence,13 
as well as collective rights of faculty self governance, which includes 
peer review and participation in university governance.14 
The second broad issue of my talk concerns the changes that have 
been occurring—particularly since 1980—in the traditional definition of 
the university’s institutional character.  These changes have affected 
both the goals and practices of the university through the process of the 
“corporatization” of the university.  I will highlight three areas of the 
multiple ways in which these changes have taken place. 
The first concerns the change of the mission of the university, from 
its traditional public interest mission to a goal of serving private market 
interests of corporations and the university.  This shift creates an 
 
has been widely accepted by academic organizations and institutions, has been described as 
“adher[ing] to, adapt[ing], and strengthen[ing]” the principles of the 1915 Declaration.  Id.  The 
1915 Declaration has been called “the single most important document relating to American 
academic freedom.”  Byrne, supra note 4, at 276.  It has also been called “the first comprehensive 
analysis of academic freedom in the United States, [which] remains the foundation for the nonlegal 
understanding of academic freedom within the academic world.”  David M. Rabban, Functional 
Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 232 (1990). 
 9. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 165-66.  See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER & 
WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 419, 
426–27, 439, 439 n.94 (1955); ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE 
UNIVERSITIES 14–17 (1986). 
 10. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 158-61 (asserting that the institutional legitimacy of 
a university is dependent on its identity as a “public trust,” given the role of “education [as] the 
cornerstone of the structure of society,” and “advancing knowledge by the unrestricted research and 
unfettered discussion of impartial investigators”). 
 11. Byrne, supra note 4, at 273-76; Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81. 
 12. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 158. 
 13. Id. at 160-63. 
 14. Id. at 169. 
4
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institutional conflict of interest for the university between its public 
interest goals and the private economic interests that it has now adopted.  
The second aspect of the changes brought about by corporatization flows 
from this shift in the university’s mission, which is implemented through 
university policies and practices.  My focus, in this talk, is primarily on 
the increased interest in the commercial potential of academic research, 
particularly regarding the lucrative potential of life science research 
following the mid-1970s explosion of genetic engineering and 
biotechnology.15  The third aspect of the changes resulting from 
corporatization relates to the impact on the professional norms of faculty 
academic freedom and academic culture due to conflicts of interest 
created by faculty concerns for proprietary interests in research. 
The revolutionary advances in academic genetics research 
coincided with important legislative and judicial developments 
encouraging a huge increase in university market activity through 
patenting and licensing of research.  Since World War II, universities 
have continued to rely heavily on public funding to support academic 
research activity.16  Prior to 1980, such public research funding policy 
was consistent with the value of academic freedom and universities 
functioning in the public interest, as there was a presumption that 
publicly funded research result would be placed into the public 
domain.17  A major legislative development in 1980 altered that 
 
 15. See, MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 23-27 
(1986) (discussing the impact of the development of recombinant DNA); Sheldon Krimsky, The 
Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 17–18 
(1999) (describing the way in which “rDNA technology . . . opened up possibilities for synthesizing 
new organisms and establishing revolutionary methods for mass producing biological products,” 
with the simultaneous recognition of “[t]he commercial opportunities of this discovery.”) 
 16. See, KENNEY, supra note 15, at 35-36 (stating that federal funding levels have consistently 
provided universities with at least sixty to seventy percent of research support since 1960).  See also 
Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 40.  
Public funding for university life sciences research is estimated at seventy to eighty percent of total 
funding.  David Blumenthal, Biotech in Northeast Ohio Conference: Conflict of Interest in 
Biomedical Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX  377, 380-81 (2002); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, 
Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 457 (1997). 
 17. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663, 1671–91 
(1996) (detailing post-World War II government “spending on research and development to support 
the war effort” and the debate of “who should own title to [government-sponsored] research”); Arti 
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 92–93 (1999).  The government agency could choose to dedicate an invention to 
the public domain by publishing the results without obtaining a patent or by providing nonexclusive 
licenses to private parties seeking to use a government-owned patent.  Eisenberg, supra, at 1675–76; 
Rai, supra, at 97 n.113.  In some agencies, a university or other government contractor could 
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presumption, with the Federal Bayh-Dole Act,18 which is based on 
values in tension with the university’s public interest mission.  Bayh-
Dole was enacted in the early stages of the drive toward privatization of 
public services and public institutions in the United States.19  Bayh-Dole 
transformed the university’s public mission by emphasizing private 
corporate interests through the commercialization of publicly funded 
research discoveries.  Specifically, the Bayh-Dole Act authorizes and 
encourages federal fund recipients to patent the results of their federally 
funded research.20  The patents belong to the federal fund recipient—
including universities—which can then license these patents for use, 
including exclusive licenses to for-profit corporations21 such as Merck, 
Monsanto, and Novartis, for commercial development. 
These market research activities undermine academic freedom and 
the public mission of the university.  The university’s interests now 
overlap with private economic interests of business corporations, 
creating a conflict of interest that compromises the university’s 
independence to engage in academic research without regard to the 
commercial potential of research.22  This conflict of interest, in turn, can 
damage both the actual quality of the research and the public confidence 
in the legitimacy of university research.23  Corporations that negotiate 
exclusive licenses of university patents can now charge monopoly 
prices, creating an added cost to the public through the Bayh-Dole Act’s 
use of public funding as an indirect subsidy to private businesses.24  The 
exclusive licensing of university-owned patents to businesses, therefore, 
is tantamount to the corporate purchase of the university’s federally 
funded patent. 
The Bayh-Dole Act has had its desired effect of privatizing publicly 
funded research, evidenced by the enormous increase in the patenting 
and licensing activities in the university.  In 1979, prior to the Bayh-
Dole Act, U.S. universities obtained 264 patents.25  That number 
 
petition the federal agency to shift title from the government to the contractor.  Eisenberg, supra, at 
1683–84, 1691–92. 
 18. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2001). 
 19. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 780. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).  See also Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1664-65. 
 21. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1663-65. 
 22. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 782, 789; Social Implications, supra 
note 1. 
 23. Social Implications, supra note 1. 
 24. Id.; Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1666–69; Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, 
at 782. 
 25. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 292 (2003). 
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increased to 2,436 patents obtained by U.S. universities in 1997,26 and 
3,450 patents in 2003.27  Between 1991 and 2000, new patent 
applications by U.S. universities increased by 238 percent, university-
industry licensing agreements increased by 161 percent, and royalty 
revenues to universities increased by more than 520 percent.28 
In addition to authorizing and encouraging the use of public 
funding for the private interest, the Bayh-Dole Act also increased the 
contact between industry and academia, greasing the wheels for the 
growth of private corporate funding for academic research.  As in the 
case of increased university patenting and licensing activities since 1980, 
there is also a trend of rising corporate funding of university research.  
Corporate funding of university research, in general, rose from 2.3 
percent in the early 1970s to almost 8 percent by the year 2000,29 and 
11.7 percent of life sciences research in 1994.30  Corporate funding 
includes both faculty research support and faculty consulting fees.31  At 
the institutional level of the university, corporate funding has included 
multi-million dollar, multi-year “strategic corporate alliances.”32  The 
notorious 1998 Berkeley-Novartis agreement is the most widely 
known,33 but certainly not the sole example,34 of a strategic corporate 
alliance.  Under these agreements, a corporation gives millions of dollars 
 
 26. Id. at 291-92. 
 27. Goldie Blumenstyk, Colleges Seek a Record Number of Patents, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Dec. 3, 2004, at 27. 
 28. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, SCI., 
Aug. 22, 2003, at 1052. 
 29. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 12 (2003). 
 30. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the 
Life Sciences–An Industry Survey, NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 8, 1996, at 368, 369–71. 
 31. See Blumenthal, supra note 16, at 379 (estimating that about half of life sciences faculty 
members act as consultants for industry).  Since the mid-1980s, twenty-one to twenty-eight percent 
of life sciences faculty members have consistently received research support from industry, and 
about seven to eight percent of faculty members reported that they held equity in a company related 
to their research.  Id. at 378-79.  See Social Implications, supra note 1. 
 32. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 788 (quotes added); Social 
Implications, supra note 1. 
 33. See Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 39-40 (explaining that Novartis (Syngenta) 
agreed to provide $25 million of corporate funding over a five-year period in exchange for exclusive 
licensing rights to about one-third of the Plant and Microbial Biology department’s discoveries). 
 34. See, e.g., KENNEY, supra note 15, at 67–69 (describing the 1982 agreement in which 
Monsanto gave Washington University $23.5 million of corporate funds over five years in exchange 
for exclusive licensing rights to patents resulting from biomedical research); Andrew Lawler, Last 
of the Big-Time Spenders?, SCI., Jan. 17, 2003, at 330 (describing the 1994 agreement in which 
Amgen gave $30 million of corporate funding to the MIT Departments of Biology and Brain and 
Cognitive Sciences over a ten-year period in exchange for resulting patents to be owned jointly by 
MIT and Amgen). 
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to fund entire university departments for research programs in exchange 
for the right to exclusive licenses for academic research developed in 
that department or program.35  In other words, the corporation gets 
exclusive monopoly control over academic research results.  The 
strategic corporate alliance extends additional benefits, including the 
right of corporate pre-publication review of academic research,36 
preferred access to faculty, students, and university facilities,37 and the 
right to participate in the process of deciding which faculty will be 
awarded corporate research funds.38 
Similarly to the Bayh-Dole Act, the growth in private corporate 
funding imposes multiple costs on the public.39  Although public funding 
of research is not at issue, the public mission of the university is still at 
issue, with similar costs to the public interest.  Through the use of 
patents and licenses, the public domain of academic research results will 
be restricted.  The university is placed in a conflict of interests, as it 
seeks to attract corporate funding for academic research that will 
enhance the corporation’s and the university’s financial interests rather 
than the public interest.  As the university and faculty become business 
partners with the funding corporation, the university loses its 
independence.  The distinction between the research and development 
department of a for-profit corporation and the research carried out in a 
university starts to become blurred or perhaps completely 
unrecognizable in certain aspects. 
Among faculty, the market-driven policies and practices of 
university corporatization undermine traditional professional norms of 
academic freedom, which are based on faculty autonomy and 
independence from private economic interests—whether those private 
interests are those of the faculty member, the university, or third-party 
funders.40  Such independence is needed to support the quality and 
integrity of the research and to support a faculty culture that values 
 
 35. Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 788; Social Implications, supra note 1. 
 36. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology 
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 216-26 (1987) (stating that publications may be delayed for three to six 
months to provide time for corporate review and for filing patent applications); Krimsky, supra note 
15, at 30; Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, 
Values, and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 
201–12 (2002). 
 37. KENNEY, supra note 15, at 55–72. 
 38. Charles C. Caldart, Industry Investment in University Research, SCI., TECH., & HUM. 
VALUES, Spring 1983, at 24-25; Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 40. 
 39. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 786-88; Social Implications, supra 
note 1. 
 40. See Byrne, supra note 4, at 273-76; Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81. 
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openness in research—sharing research methods and results in the public 
domain.41  The expansion of the public domain, in turn, promotes the 
quality and advancement of academic research, as researchers share their 
discoveries and test the research results of their colleagues.  The shift of 
university mission from public to private interests and the accompanying 
increase in market-driven practices have had a negative impact on these 
professional norms and culture of academic freedom.  Similar to the 
university institutional conflict of interests, faculty involved in market 
activities have individual professional conflicts of interest.42  Communal 
values are undermined by increased secrecy resulting from private 
economic concerns about preserving proprietary rights in research 
results.43  Dependence on corporate research funds compromises 
independence in research, for example, when the university 
administration or faculty agree to submit research results for corporate 
review prior to publication.  Studies have demonstrated a significant 
impact on research, with more favorable research results concerning the 
corporate funder’s product by faculty whose research is funded by the 
corporation.44  Disturbing incidents have been reported of corporate 
pressure placed on faculty researchers to change or suppress research 
findings that go against the corporation’s interests.45 
As previously stated, I find that several recent developments show 
some recognition of the harms resulting from university corporatization, 
which can lead to hope for change and reform.  There are three issues 
that have recently been in the spotlight that show that even bad news can 
 
 41. See BERNARD BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 84-100 (1953) (regarding the 
values of “communalism,” openness in research, and “disinterestness” in science research); ROBERT 
K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973); Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 181–84; Rai, supra 
note 17, at 88–94. 
 42. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 772; Social Implications, supra note 
1. 
 43. See KENNEY, supra note 15, at 108–11,121-31; Blumenthal, supra note 30, at 372–73; 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 1363, 1375 (1988); Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and 
Organisms Undermine the Exchange of Scientific Ideas, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at 
B6.  See also Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast 
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study 
of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 133, 149 (2004) (discussing 
the negative impact on researchers of the decreased sharing of basic data). 
 44. Krimsky, supra note 15, at 34; Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug 
Studies Published in Symposium Proceedings, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Mar. 1, 1996, at 485; Mark 
Clayton, Corporate Cash & Campus Labs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 19, 2001, at 11; Press & 
Washburn, supra note 16, at 42. 
 45. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 75-83; Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 42; Peter 
Ritter, Bitter Pills, CITY PAGES, July 4, 2001, at http://www.citypages.com/databank/ 
22/1074/article9665.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). 
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be good news if it draws attention to problems of conflicts of interest 
that can harm the public interest.  The first issue concerns the 2004 
external evaluation report of the Berkley-Novartis Strategic Corporate 
Alliance, concluding that universities should avoid such agreements due 
to the problems of conflicts of interest.46  One of the most interesting 
aspects of the report is the lengthy discussion of policy issues, 
encouraging faculty and the university to engage in public debate about 
the identity of the university, including issues of the public mission of 
the university, conflicts of interest, and collegial relationships and values 
that may be altered by such large corporate funding agreements.47 
The second development is the public discussion of the potential 
influence of corporate financial support for drug trials at the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).  Since 1992, “user fees” from industry have 
supported drug approval reviews conducted by the FDA.48  The recent 
spotlight on this issue provides important evidence of the potential 
impact on public health when an institutional public interest mission 
conflicts with private corporate economic interests.  In particular, the 
delays and even possible suppression of FDA employees’ reports of the 
medical risks of pharmaceutical products such as Vioxx and anti-
depressant medications for treatment of adolescents have raised 
important questions of whether FDA dependence on corporate support 
has led to the restriction of the public domain and a lack of integrity in 
FDA drug approval decisions.49  Dr. David Graham, the FDA researcher 
who had the courage to speak publicly about the FDA’s suppression of 
evidence concerning drug safety, has sought whistleblower protection 
due to his fear of retaliation from his government employer.50  Any 
reasonable person witnessing the problems at the FDA would find a 
need for legislative or agency regulations to ensure that the conflict 
between public and private interests does not result in the sacrifice of 
 
 46. See Lawrence Busch et al., External Review of the Collaborative Research Agreement 
between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc. and The Regents of the University of 
California (2004), available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/07/external_ 
novartis_review.pdf. 
 47. Id.  See also Goldie Blumenstyk, Reviewers Give Thumbs Down to Corporate Deal at 
Berkeley, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2004, at 25; Rex Dalton, Biotech Funding Deal Judged 
to be ‘a Mistake’ for Berkeley, NATURE, Aug. 5, 2004, at 598. 
 48. See Gardiner Harris, At FDA, Strong Drug Ties and Less Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
2004, at A1. 
 49. See Gardiner Harris, Drug-Safety Reviewer Says F.D.A. Delayed Vioxx Study, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A21; Gardiner Harris, FDA Leader Says Study Tied to Vioxx Wasn’t 
Suppressed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at C7. 
 50. See Denise Grady, FDA Employee Seeks Help from Whistle-Blowers’ Group, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 2004, at A21. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/5
LIEBERWITZ1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:58:52 AM 
2005] THE CORPORATIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 769 
public health and safety.51  In fact, Congress is now considering the need 
for an independent arm of the FDA to act as watchdog—this, of course, 
means that the original watchdog function of the FDA has been 
compromised by its overriding concerns with private corporate 
interests.52  Similarly, the ever-increasing role of private industry in the 
university—particularly, through licensing of publicly and privately 
funded patents—should raise the same concerns about the compromise 
of university independence, institutional integrity, reliability of research 
results, and the restriction of the public domain. 
The third development concerns public access to scholarly 
publications reporting results of federally funded research.  The National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) has proposed a plan to place on its website 
scholarly articles reporting the results of publicly NIH-funded research.53  
This plan would, therefore, expand the public domain by providing the 
public with free access to articles that are published in expensive 
scientific and medical journals.  The NIH plan is opposed by the private, 
for-profit journals that are concerned with their economic interests and 
by nonprofit journals concerned with maintaining a revenue flow 
sufficient to support their publication expenses.54  This debate brings 
into the open the question about how to best serve the public, raising 
fundamental issues about the role and functions of a public agency like 
the NIH in contrast with the private goals of the publishing industry. 
These three recent developments demonstrate that even in times of 
seemingly insuperable power of capitalist institutions, concerns with the 
 
 51. See Denise Grady, A Medical Journal Calls for a New Watchdog on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2004, at A18. 
 52. See Barry Meier, A Top Republican to Offer Drug Data Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, 
at C3; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Idea of Drug Safety Office Is Already Hitting Snags, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
25, 2004, at A30. 
 53. See Julianne Basinger, NIH Would Post Free Online Papers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Sept. 17, 2004, at 14; Lila Guterman, NIH Proceeds With Plan to Provide Open Access to Scientific 
Papers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 10, 2004, at 19.  See also Art Brodsky, Public Knowledge 
Disappointed in New Open Access Policy, at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pressroom/releases/ 
pressrelease.2005-02-03.9256951814 (stating that on February 3, 2005, the NIH announced its 
policy that requests NIH-funded authors to make their articles available for free online access on its 
PubMed Central Web site within twelve months of official publication date).  This policy has been 
criticized for weakening the original proposal that would have required NIH-funded authors to make 
their papers available for free online access within six months of official publication date.  Id.  See 
also Social Implications, supra note 1; Lila Guterman, The NIH Reportedly Is Weakening Its Plan 
for Free Access to Journal Articles, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 28, 2005, at 16 (stating that 
additional developments at the NIH to address problems of corporate influence and conflicts of 
interest include the NIH issuing a temporary one-year prohibition, announced in September 2004, of 
NIH researchers’ paid consulting for corporations, pending further systematic reforms). 
 54. See Lila Guterman, The Promise and Peril of ‘Open Access,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 
30, 2004, at 10. 
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public interest can still take center stage and demand our attention.  I am 
encouraged by the existence of organizations that seek to further public 
interest goals of universities.  Some have been in existence for almost a 
century, like the AAUP.  Others are newer, such as Universities Allied 
for Essential Medicines55 and Public Knowledge,56 which seek to expand 
the public domain of academic research.  Through a combination of 
individual and collective efforts, faculty academic freedom and 
university independence can be reclaimed and restored.  I hope that 
university faculty will seize such developments as opportunities to face 
similar issues in the context of the university’s public interest mission 
and academic freedom. 
 
 55. See UNIVERSITIES ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, ABOUT UNIVERSITIES ALLIED FOR 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, at http://www.essentialmedicines.org/about.html (stating that “Universities 
Allied for Essential Medicines” links universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada, to support faculty and student efforts to place pressure on the universities to waive their 
patent rights on AIDS medicines in developing countries). 
 56. See PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, OPEN ACCESS, at http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/ 
openaccess.html (stating that Public Knowledge describes its goals in its Open Access Project as 
“work[ing] for open access to (1) taxpayer-funded research and (2) research that scientists and 
scholars consent to publish without payment”). 
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